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Introduction

In May of 2016, newspapers reported on the story of Sheldon MacKenzie, a Jamaican man
who was in Canada on a temporary work permit.1 He was employed as an agricultural worker on
a farm in Manitoba. He had been brought to Canada to work for several years in a row, and his
family had benefitted significantly from his labour. In particular, it allowed him to pay tuition to
send his daughters to their local school. Mr. MacKenzie was injured on the job and fell into a
coma. He died three months later in a Canadian hospital. What makes this tragic story unusual is
that Mr. MacKenzie was not deported back to Jamaica. Upon being injured and no longer able to
work, his work-related rights to receive health care and to remain in Canada both effectively

Rosa Marchitelli, “Migrant Worker Program Called ‘Worse Than Slavery’ After Injured Participants Sent Home
Without Treatment”, CBC (16 May 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/jamaican-farm-worker-sent-home-ina-casket-1.3577643>.
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came to an end. His family, however, intervened. They filed an application for Mr. MacKenzie to
be allowed to remain in Canada, on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, while receiving
medical treatment. They obtained a stay of his deportation while that application was being
determined. Although his death from his workplace injuries occurred before the application was
heard, he continued to receive care up until his death, and did not suffer from the disruption and
uncertainty that being deported back to Jamaica would have entailed.
This paper explores how health interests and rights play out in the temporary agricultural
worker regime. In particular, it illustrates how a system that–as discussed below–is formally
positioned as granting such workers the same rights as nationals, may not in practice provide
equivalent or meaningful protections. The assessment is not just about the social exclusion
challenges that often undermine the ability or possibility of migrant workers to activate their
legal rights (which is the usual critique of why post-national citizenship writing is overly
optimistic),2 but about how the legal and regulatory system itself misses the mark.
Mr. MacKenzie’s story gestures to some of the tensions that undergird the migrant worker
regime. To be explicit, the regime operates in the broader context of poverty, environmental
degradation, and other locally experienced hardships. This contributes to a constant supply of
migrants from the south who are willing to experience extended separations from their families
and social isolation in exchange for employment in the north, filling jobs that Canadians
ostensibly refuse to take. Their reward is real: economic gains for their families that would
otherwise be outside of their grasp.
Canada’s economy benefits significantly from such workers and has done so since the 1940s,
when we first introduced programs to fill low-skill labour gaps in a variety of areas on a
temporary basis. The number of temporary migrant workers who support our economy has ebbed

Tanya Basok, “Post-National Citizenship, Social Exclusion and Migrants Rights: Mexican Seasonal Workers in
Canada” (2004) 8:1 Citizenship Studies 47 at 50.
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and flowed, but overall, it has increased over the years.3 These programs have considerable
support from employers, who petition for expanding them and reducing fees.4
As currently defined,5 the Temporary Foreign Worker Program authorizes several streams of
workers.6 Some of these streams are directed at filling seasonal or short-term labour needs; these
job offerings are premised on the worker not becoming a permanent part of our labour market.7
A few programs contemplate the worker having the opportunity to potentially obtain permanent
resident status in Canada after having worked here for a certain period of time. These streams
have different requirements and restrictions. In all cases, such workers have, in principle, health
protections while working in Canada that are equivalent to those of Canadian citizens and
permanent residents (hereinafter referred to as “nationals”).
These protections arise where workers are included in the same regimes that protect nationals
or where employers are required to subscribe to private insurers who offer an equivalent basket
of services and protections. On its face, temporary migrant workers residing in Canada appear to
have become “post-national citizens” in terms of their health interests, as they formally benefit
“from the legal extension of rights previously reserved for the national population.”8

3

From 1996 to 2015, the number of individuals in Canada with work permits under the Temporary Foreign Worker
program increased from 14,663 to 69,138, with a high of 112,563 in 2009. See Government of Canada, Immigration,
Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Facts & Figures 2015: Immigration Overview - Temporary Residents - Annual
IRCC Updates”, online: <open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/052642bb-3fd9-4828-b608c81dff7e539c?_ga=1.45405795.639513810.1482239377>. However, there are currently around 250,000 to 300,000
people in Canada with temporary status, who are authorized to work. Temporary work permits may be issued to
foreign students, spouses of temporary workers or students, those present in Canada through numerous international
agreements, etc. See Government of Canada, 2016 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, online:
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/annual-report-2016/index.asp>
4
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of
Persons with Disabilities, Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Report of the Standing Committee on Human
Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (September 2016) (Chair:
Bryan May) [Standing Committee of 2016].
5
Categories have changed over the years. Currently, only temporary positions where the employee is being hired to
fill a specific labour gap and where the employer must obtain a labour market impact assessment are referred to as
part of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program.
6
Standing Committee of 2016 supra note 4 at 3.
7
The legitimacy of this premise – that the labour needs are only temporary and thus the right to be in Canada should
also be temporary – has long been questioned. See Sedef Arat-Koc, “Good Enough to Work but Not Good Enough
to Stay” in E Comac, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 1999) 125.
8
Basok, supra note 2 at 50.
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This paper focuses specifically on the temporary agricultural worker regime. Currently, most
agricultural workers come to Canada through one of two programs. One is the Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP),9 which commenced in 1966. It operates under bi-lateral
Memorandums of Understanding between Canada and other governments–in particular, with the
governments of several Caribbean countries and Mexico. Prospective Canadian employers
identify the source country whose workers they would like to employ, and the request is screened
by Canada’s federal government to ensure the employers meet the terms of the program.
Aspiring workers apply to their home governments, who then select and assign the workers. As
part of this process–and importantly for the purposes of this analysis–workers must pass health
screenings.10 The work terms range from six weeks to a maximum of eight months. The
employment contract is a standardized one, approved by both governments. Although the home
government determines which workers can participate, employers can request that named
workers be selected to return for subsequent work terms. Nominated returns are the norm: in
2010, nearly 80 percent of Mexican SAWP workers in Canada were so nominated.11
The second route is the Agricultural Stream of Canada’s Temporary Foreign Worker
Program (the “Agricultural Stream”). This program, which was initiated in 2011, contemplates
private contracts of employment and work permits of up to two years’ duration. Although the
contract is not completely standardized–as discussed below–certain terms are mandatory. As will
become apparent, Agricultural Stream workers are, in many instances, situated differently than
SAWP workers.
On its face, Canada’s approach to temporary migrant workers is robust and just, with all
parties holding a winning hand. It formally complies with several of the core health and safety

9

SAWP is authorized under nation-to-nation agreements between Canada and Mexico, and between Canada and 11
Caribbean countries. Each agreement outlines the responsibilities of the respective governments. Canada and the
respective other country also approve standardized contracts, which identify employer and employee obligations.
See Government of Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, “Hire a Temporary Worker Through the
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program” (25 January 2016), online: <www.canada.ca/en/employment-socialdevelopment/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/seasonal-agricultural.html>.
10
See e.g. Government of Barbados Ministry of Labour, “Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme”,
online: <labour.gov.bb/neb_overseas_employ_prog_agricultural?printable=yes>.
11
Jenna Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?: Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration in Canada”
(2012) Institute for Research on Public Policy, Study No 26 at 5 [Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?”].
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obligations identified in key international human rights instruments concerning migrant workers,
despite Canada not being a signatory to said conventions.12 For example, the Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, a major post-national citizenship instrument,13
requires that migrant workers have the same health and safety rights as nationals,14 which
Canada seems to grant.15 This would appear to indicate that the precarious status that temporary
migrant workers otherwise occupy does not spill over into their health care experiences.16
However, as Mr. MacKenzie’s story suggests, and this paper illustrates, this expectation
is not consistently borne out. There are several reasons for this. Structurally, temporary migrant
workers occupy a different position than nationals due to how their employment status intersects
with their migration status. Their situation may be understood as one of “market citizenship,”
where rights are hinged not on an understanding of human rights, but are instead linked to their
participation in the market economy.17 As migrant workers lack meaningful market mobility,
they are rendered especially vulnerable market citizens, constituting what leading labour law
scholar Judy Fudge has termed “unfree labour.”18 A tangible outcome of this is that they may be
unable to experience comparable care and protection merely by being included within regimes
designed to serve nationals.
The agriculture-specific streams were selected as the focus of this paper over other
programs that are intended to permit employers to fill general short-term labour gaps, such as

For a discussion of these instruments, and their limitations, see Judy Fudge, “Precarious Migrant Status and
Precarious Employment: The Paradox of International Rights for Migrant Workers” (2012) 34:1 Comp Lab L &
Pol’y J 95 at 122–128.
13
See discussion in Basok, supra note 2 at 47–48.
14
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families,
18 December 1990, UNTS 2220 arts 25(1)(a), 43(1)(e), 70 (entered into force 1 July 2003). It is not clear whether
Canada complies with Article 28. Canada is not, however, a signatory to this Convention.
15
Fudge, supra note 12 at 128.
16
There is a sizable literature on the precarious status of temporary migrant workers which highlights how such
workers do not enjoy the basic rights and entitlements of permanent residents, such as mobility rights, family
reunification, and a direct path to permanency should they so desire. See e.g. Salimah Valiani, “The Shifting
Landscape of Contemporary Canadian Immigration Policy” in Luin Goldring & Patricia Landott, eds, Producing
and Negotiating Non-Citizenship: Precarious Legal Status in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013)
55 at 57. For a discussion of the evolution of this concept, see Fudge, supra note 12 at 98–103.
17
Natalie Deckard & Alison Heslin, “After Postnational Citizenship: Constructing the Boundaries of Inclusion in
Neoliberal Contexts” (2016) 10:4 Sociology Compass 294 at 294–95.
18
Fudge, supra note 12 at 95
12
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food counter attendants. This decision rested on two factors. First, the route by which most
agricultural workers enter, work, and live in Canada is more highly regulated by the state than
other temporary worker regimes.19 Canada has already earmarked most of these workers for
special legal attention. Second, agricultural workers are employed in a high-risk industry. The
risks associated with agriculture include long hours and reduced rest days, the use of heavy
machinery, repetitive manual labour, and the potential for exposure to pesticides and other
chemicals. These risks translate into high rates of work-related illness, poisoning, fatalities,
injury, and disability, including high rates of traumatic brain injury.20 Workers’ compensation
data indicates agricultural workers have a heightened serious injury rate and longer recovery
time.21 As the nature of the work itself renders all agricultural workers vulnerable to health
harms, a failure for migrant agricultural workers to access and realize the promised health care
rights and protections can be expected to have particularly detrimental and potentially long term
effects.
I turn now to describing the health protection regime and the experiences of workers who have a
workplace injury or health need. I then assess the role of law in structuring elements of
inaccessibility.
II.

Agricultural Migrant Workers and Health Rights in Canada

All Canadian nationals benefit from federal and provincial or territorial regimes that
recognize they have certain health and workplace safety rights. There is no single history of said
rights, but in general, it is safe to associate their emergence with the development of the welfare

19

See ibid at 111–112 (Fudge compares the level of state involvement with SAWP workers versus other temporary
migrant workers).
20
Janet McLaughlin, Jenna Hennebry & Ted Haines, “Paper Versus Practice: Occupational Health and Safety
Protections and Realities for Temporary Foreign Agricultural Workers in Ontario” (2014) 16:2 Perspectives
interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé at 2, online: <pistes.revues.org/3844>.
21
Kerry Preibisch & Gerardo Otero, “Does Citizenship Status Matter in Canadian Agriculture? Workplace Health
and Safety for Migrant and Immigrant Laborers” (2014) 79:2 Rural Sociology 174 at 179 [Preibisch & Otero, “Does
Citizenship Matter”]. For a discussion of how these factors are exacerbated in the case of foreign agricultural
workers, see Jenna Hennebry et al, Health Across Borders: Health Status, Risks and Care Among Transnational
Migrant Farm Workers in Ontario (Toronto: CERIS Ontario Metropolis Project, 2008) at 9 [Hennebry et al, Health
Across Borders].
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state.22 As noted above, the Canadian system is structured such that temporary foreign workers,
including SAWP workers and Agricultural Stream workers, are to have their health interests
protected and supported in a manner that is consistent with that afforded to nationals. The
general nature of how these commitments are structured in terms of workers’ compensation
regimes, health and safety standards, and health insurance, is described below.
All Canadian provinces and territories, for example, have a workers’ compensation regime
which employers may pay into. It compensates workers who experience an occupation-related
illness or injury in lieu of retaining a common law right to sue for injury.23 The compensation
extends to lost future earnings, as well as supporting needs resulting from the injury or illness
and re-training. Importantly, these regimes operate on a no-fault basis, so there is no obligation
to show negligence on the part of the employer to access compensation. Since employer
premiums increase when benefits are paid out to their workers,24 employers are motivated to
ensure that they have a safe workplace (and also may have an interest in contesting claims).
Governments have shown considerable commitment to ensuring that temporary agricultural
workers benefit from these regimes. The inclusion of SAWP workers in provincial workers’
compensation regimes is explicitly expressed either in legislation, or through instruments such as
policy directives.25 In some instances, these instruments are very sensitive to the SAWP context
and the limited control that workers are likely to have over aspects of their lives, which may, in
other contexts, be outside of the employment relationship. For example, the policy that is in force
in Ontario states that SAWP workers are covered “as soon as they reach the agreed-upon point of
departure in their homeland, and remains in place until they return to their country” and extends
coverage to “periods of leisure, meals and while sleeping in employer-provided quarters.”26

22

Deckard & Heslin, supra note 17 at 295–96.
See e.g British Columbia’s Workers Compensation Act, RSBC 1996, c 492, s 1; Ontario’s Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act 1997, SO 1997, c 16. For a discussion of the goals of workers compensation regimes and the tradeoffs for workers, see Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act 1983 (Nfld.), [1989] 1 SCR 922, aff'g 67 Nfld &
PEIR 16, 44 DLR (4th) 501.
24
Anette Sikka, Katherine Lippel & Jill Hanley, “Access to Healthcare and Workers’ Compensation for Precarious
Migrants in Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick” (2011) 5:2 McGill JL & Health at para 76.
25
Government of Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Temporary Foreign Workers: Your
Rights are Protected” (22 August 2017), online: <www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/tfw-rights.asp>.
26
Ontario, Workers Safety and Insurance Board, Policy 12-04-08: Foreign Agricultural Workers (Toronto: Workers
Safety and Insurance Board, 2009).
23
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Thus, on its face, the regime is highly responsive. SAWP workers should expect fulsome
protection under workers’ compensation regimes for occupation-related illness or injury.
Similarly, for Agricultural Steam workers, the employer is required to either arrange and pay
for provincial workplace safety insurance coverage, or to provide such coverage through private
insurance. If the employer choses this second route, the coverage must be consistent with
“arrangements made for Canadian and permanent residents.”27 Thus, the explicit state goal is
equivalency with the protections afforded to nationals.
All Canadian provinces also have workplace standards and safety legislation, which on their
face extend the same protections and rights to all, making no distinctions based on whether or
not the worker is a national.28 For example, British Columbia’s legislation turns on the fact of
there being an employer/employee relationship and expressly “applies to all employees” unless
they are categorically excluded under regulations. 29 British Columbia’s regulations, like those of
other provinces, do not exclude temporary foreign workers from the scope of the legislation.
They do, like other jurisdictions, exclude farm workers from certain provisions, including those
that restrict hours of employment and require the observance of statutory holidays,30 and import
a different approach to minimum wage where work is hand-harvesting various types of
produce.31 This creates a workplace that is characterized by otherwise unacceptably long
workdays and few breaks. It is important to note that these exclusions apply to all farm workers
in Canada, not just those workers hired through SAWP or the Agricultural Stream.32 When it
comes to hours, the standardized SAWP agreements expressly include terms obliging employers
to treat SAWP workers as well as they do nationals, including, for example, requiring employers,
when making requests for work days that exceed eight hours, to do so “in accordance with the
customs of the district and the spirit of the program, giving the same rights to Mexican workers

See Employment and Social Development Canada, “Agricultural Stream: Employment Contract” form EMP5510
(2016-12-005)E, clause 8 [“Employment Contract”].
28
Sarah Marsden, “‘Silence Means Yes Here in Canada’: Precarious Migrants, Work and the Law” (2014) 18:1
CLELJ 1 at para 17.
29
Employment Standards Act, RSBC 1996, c 113, s 1(1).
30
Employment Standards Regulation, BC Reg 396/95, s 34.1.
31
Ibid, s 40.1.
32
See ibid s 1(1), which defines “farm worker” in terms of employment responsibilities, not migration status.
27
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as given to Canadian workers.”33 In so far as Canada protects its national agricultural work force,
the regulatory regime also protects the temporary migrant labour force.
The Canadian regime is also shaped to ensure that SAWP and Agricultural Stream workers
have health care insurance coverage. The form that this coverage takes varies between provinces.
In Ontario and Quebec, SAWP workers are automatically enrolled in provincial medicare
regimes upon arrival.34 Manitoba appears to have recently adopted this approach as well.35 In
other provinces, medicare coverage turns on meeting a residency requirement. In British
Columbia, if the work permit is for six months or more, then the worker is deemed to have met
the residency requirement upon arrival.36 However, if the permit is for a lesser period of time,
then the employer must obtain private health insurance for the worker. The insurance must cover
non-occupational accidents, sickness, hospitalization, and death benefits.37 The employer can
deduct money from the worker’s wages to cover the cost of the insurance.38 In other provinces,
eligibility for medicare arises only after the worker has physically resided in the province for a
certain period of time, usually three months, and the intervening gap must be filled by private
insurance under the terms described above. The SAWP agreements enable the home country to
control aspects of this arrangement. For example, for all SAWP workers from Mexico, the
employer is required to acquire said insurance from a specific identified provider, with the
insurance arrangement being brokered through the Mexican consulate.39 So, on the face of it, all
Government of Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, “Agreement for the Employment in
Canada of Seasonal Agricultural Workers from Mexico – 2017” s I(3), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-socialdevelopment/migration/documents/assets/portfolio/docs/en/foreign_workers/hire/seasonal_agricultural/documents/s
awpmc2017.pdf> [“Agreement for Employment”].
34
Health Insurance Act RRO 1990, Reg 552, s 1.3(2)(4); Health Insurance Act, CQLR c A-29, r1, s 3(3).
35
The author could not locate regulatory authorization for this practice, but rather relies on a brief that was
submitted to Parliament by a migrant worker NGO in 2016. See Migrant Worker Solidarity Network Manitoba, “A
Brief on the Temporary Foreign Worker Program” submitted to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Human Resources, Skill and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (HUMA) 20 May 2016
at 2, online: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/421/HUMA/Brief/BR8374833/brexternal/MigrantWorkerSolidarityNetwork-e.pdf>.
36
Medicare Protection Act, RSBC 1996, c 286, s1; Medical and Health Care Services Regulation, BC Reg 426/97, s
2(b).
37
See e.g. “Agreement for Employment” supra note 33 ss V(3), V(6)(a).
38
See e.g. ibid.
39
See e.g. Consulate General of Mexico in Vancouver, 2015 Season Guidelines: Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Program, at 11, online: <consulmex.sre.gob.mx/vancouver/images/stories/sawp2015.compressed.pdf>. This
guideline requires medical coverage with Great West Life Insurance Company (GWLI) for non-work related
33
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SAWP workers are covered for health care needs, either through provincial or private regimes,
although in some cases the SAWP worker bears the cost of being protected.
The Agricultural Stream workers, whose work permits may be up to two years long, typically
have a waiting period of several months for provincial medicare coverage as they are not
exempted from any provincial or territorial waiting periods. During this time, the employer is
required to provide private health care coverage.40 Unlike SWAP, the federal regime prohibits
the employer from deducting the cost of insurance from the worker’s wages. The relevant clause
in the employer/employee contract, which Canada requires be used, is:
7.1 The employer agrees to arrange and pay for the temporary foreign worker’s private health
insurance at no cost to the temporary foreign worker. The coverage will begin from the time the TFW
arrives in Canada until the temporary foreign worker is covered by the appropriate
provincial/territorial health insurance plan. The private insurance provided to the temporary foreign
worker will be equivalent to the insurance plan.41

With regard to the three pillars: workers’ compensation, workplace health and safety standards,
and health insurance, we see a practice of identical or equivalent rights. The goal is to ensure that
the temporary migrant agricultural workforce is not relegated to a second or lower tier of health
care protections and care, but rather is placed on par with nationals.
III.

The Reality: Data About Access and Access Experience

The provincial and federal governments have created an overarching structure to protect
temporary migrant agricultural workers, providing exactly or substantively the same protections
that are granted to Canadian nationals. The question, then, is whether or how these protections

accidents and medical assistance. According to the Guidelines, Mexico sends GWLI an arrival manifest and GWLI
then bills the employer. This appears to be how the parties comply with Part V of the agreement.
40
In Ontario, for example, there is a three-month residency requirement. Then, as long as the work permit is for at
least six months, the worker will qualify for medicare. See Health Insurance Act supra note 34 ss 1.4(6), 1.5(1),
5(1). See also Janet McLaughlin et al, “The Migrant Farmworker Health Journey: Identifying Issues and
Considering Change Across Borders” (2014) 6 IMRC Policy Points at 6, online: <imrc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/IMRC-Policy-Points-VI.pdf>.
41
See “Employment Contract” supra note 27, clause 7.1.
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play out in the lives of individuals. It does not appear that provinces or the federal government
collect data concerning how their health needs or injuries are satisfactorily addressed or left
untreated. With the exception of one large Ontario-based study in 2010 of 585 SWAP workers42
and two medium-sized studies (one involving 242 Mexican SWAP workers who were working
in the Leamington area of Ontario,43 and the other surveying 100 Mexican SAWP workers in
British Columba),44 much of the data comes from smaller-scale studies. The data is usually based
on interviews with workers, health care providers, service organizations, and sometimes
employers.
These studies consistently find that temporary migrant workers employed in agricultural
activity experience high rates of workplace injury and illness: one study of Mexican and
Jamaican SAWP workers, for example, found a self-reported rate of illness or injury of around
25 percent.45 However, they do not experience the promised level of health care, either because
of structural disincentives which motivate workers to not seek care, or – as discussed further
below - due to access barriers.
The consensus across the studies is that temporary agricultural workers often do not report
and thus do not receive assistance for work-related injuries or work-related general illnesses;46
similarly, they also do not report unsafe working conditions.47 For example, one study
documents 30–50 percent of surveyed SAWP workers reporting that their co-workers continued
to work, without seeking care or compensation, despite illness or injury.48 In the largest study to
date, 69 percent of surveyed workers attributed current health problems to their work, but less
than one quarter sought medical assistance in Canada.49This practice needs to be understood

Jenna Hennebry, “Not Just a Few Bad Apples: Vulnerability, Health and Temporary Migration in Canada” (2010)
Canadian Issues 74 [Hennebry, “Not Just a Few Bad Apples”].
43
Basok, supra note 2 at 52.
44
Preibisch & Otero, supra note 21 at 176.
45
Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?”, supra note 11 at 17.
46
See e.g. Sylvie Gravel et al, “Ethics and the Compensation of Immigrant Workers for Work-Related Injuries and
Illnesses” (2010) 12:5 J Immigrant Minority Health 707 at 709.
47
Brem, supra note 48 at 4.
48
Maxwell Brem, Migrant Workers in Canada: A Review of the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program
(Ottawa: North-South Institute, 2006) at 10.
49
Hennebry, “Not Just a Few Bad Apples”, supra note 42 at 75.
42
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alongside the experiences of workers who do seek, or try to seek, assistance. As is discussed
below, a significant number of studies document the structural difficulties workers experience
when they attempt to get the promised assistance for their health or safety needs.50
The scholarship on these points of disconnection–investigating why workers do not seek care
and report safety issues, and the barriers to care when they do seek it–points to access barriers
that relate to the nature of the job itself. That is, they may affect, to some degree, all agricultural
workers, and reflect a general industry problem. Remoteness and long hours of work are one
such factor. In times of high production, both Mexican SAWP workers and permanent resident
agricultural workers in British Columbia report a 76-hour workweek of 12-hour days on
weekdays and 8-hour days on weekends. Low production periods involve 55-hour workweeks,
with 9-hour days on weekdays and 5-hour days on weekends.51 This means that accessing health
care is dependent on agricultural workers having reliable transportation and choosing to lose
wages so as to attend a clinic instead of filling a work shift, unless the clinic has irregular or late
opening hours.52
These access issues are compounded for migrant workers, who, given their social isolation,53
are less likely than nationals to be networked with local drivers. Recent changes to the SAWP
program appear to try to address this issue. A new employer obligation, appearing in 2016 and
also present in the 2017 contracts, obliges the employer to be responsible for transporting
workers to a hospital or clinic if a worker needs medical attention.54 This measure may help
See e.g. Michael Pysklywec et al, “Doctors Within borders: Meeting the Health Care Needs of Migrant Farm
Workers in Canada” (2011) 183:9 CMAJ 1039 at 1041.
51
Preibisch & Otero, supra note 21 at 186. Such hours of work are authorized under the MOU. See e.g. “Agreement
for Employment” supra note 33, clause I(3), II(12). For a discussion of this norm across the general industry, see
Jenna Hennebry, Janet McLaughlin & Kerry Preibisch, “Out of the Loop: (In)access to Health Care for Migrant
Workers” (2016) 17:2 Intl J Migration and Integration 528 at 529.
52
Kerry Priebisch & Jenna Hennebry, “Temporary Migration, Chronic Effects: The Health of International Migrant
Workers in Canada” (2011) 183:9 CMAJ 1033 at 1034.
53
Malcolm Sargeant & Eric Tucker, “Layers of Vulnerability in Occupational Safety and Health for Migrant
Workers: Case Studies from Canada and the UK” (2009) 7:2 Pol’y & Practice in Health & Safety 51 at 54–55.
54
The agreements from 2014 are silent on medical transportation. However, the 2016 and 2017 agreements impose
this obligation. (The author was not able to locate a copy of the 2015 agreements.) See “Agreement for the
Employment in Canada of Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers – 2017” at Part VI, online:
www.canada.ca/content/dam/canada/employment-socialdevelopment/migration/documents/assets/portfolio/docs/en/foreign_workers/hire/seasonal_agricultural/documents/s
awpcc2017.pdf> and compare with “Agreement for the Employment in Canada of Commonwealth Caribbean
50
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address some of the consequences of agricultural migrant workers being socially excluded from
the communities in which they work and reside,55 but others remain.
Language, for example, is a barrier. One study found that 46 percent of Ontario SAWP
workers who sought care had language difficulties when communicating their concerns to health
care professionals.56 This makes access contingent on the worker being able to locate and bring
along a translator who they trust and who is reliable. The situation is further problematized when
employers wrongfully retain workers’ health care cards. In Hennebry’s 2010 Ontario survey of
576 SAWP workers, more than 20 percent had not been given the care card, which their
employer had received on their behalf.57 When employers retain employees’ care cards, it means
workers must, in effect, disclose to their employer that they are seeking medical care. As
discussed below, this creates a disincentive to seek care as employees strive to ensure that their
employer will nominate them to return to work the following season, and to avoid being
repatriated for medical reasons.
Other scholars have identified that fact that migrant workers are not likely to have the same
knowledge base as nationals, and that this lack of knowledge both creates risks and renders
remedies based on rights inaccessible.58 For example, without instruction, migrant workers are
unlikely to know how medicare works, let alone how to navigate the complexities of workers’
compensation regimes. Indeed, 74 percent of surveyed SAWP workers in British Columbia
reported having a “poor” or “very poor” understanding of their health care insurance,59 and 93
percent of SAWP workers in Ontario reported they did not know how to file a claim for workers’
compensation.60 There is also a documented deficit in migrant workers’ knowledge of provincial
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safety standards, such as the requirement of employers to provide protective clothing to those
working with pesticides, or to have adequate safety training for operating equipment.61 In
Hennebry’s Ontario survey, 62 percent of Mexican workers and 35 percent of Jamaican workers
reported they had not received health and safety training.62 When safety training is properly
provided, language barriers may make the training less effective.63 Preibisch and Otero’s British
Columbia survey had similar findings.64 These last deficits point primarily to enforcement issues,
a problem that the Canadian government has been seeking to remedy for some time.65
A third commonly identified reason for temporary migrant workers to continue working
when ill or injured and to not seek assistance or workers’ compensation is the differing economic
opportunities of migrant workers in their home country versus Canada. Most SAWP workers
from Mexico, for example, are poor and landless agricultural day-workers.66 This motivates
workers to accept unsafe working conditions, and to continue to work when ill or injured, in an
attempt to maximize their earnings during their short, and perhaps only, opportunity to earn
Canadian wages.67 That is, the economic precarity that led them to seek work under the
temporary worker regime in the first place carries forward, influencing the precarity they
experience while in Canada. In turn, this is further compounded by the regulatory regime in
Canada.
IV.

The Role of Law in Structuring Inaccessibility

The regulatory regime generates and compounds vulnerability among these workers in
several ways, including the reliance on private health care rather than medicare in several
provinces, the fact that workers’ compensation regimes are designed to serve nationals rather
than migrant workers, the very real fear of medical repatriation should a worker attempt to claim
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their health protections, and other disincentives that discourage migrant agricultural workers
from seeking or accessing their rights to health care and protection.
A. Private health care is not medicare
As discussed above, the federal government incorporates terms into these programs to
enable agricultural workers to access health care. Health care is, with a few exceptions, delivered
by the provinces. The Canada Health Act recognizes that provinces have jurisdiction to define,
within limits, who is a provincial resident and thus entitled to access provincially insured
medicare.68 Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba have chosen to grant medicare coverage to all
SAWP workers upon arrival. No province has made such an allowance for Agricultural Stream
workers. The federal government has endorsed imposing obligations on employers who want to
participate in this program to turn to private plans that are mandated to provide equivalent
coverage. But the federal government cannot reach very far into mandating how such plans
operate or make them actually perform on par with medicare. The most blatant example of the
difference between private plans versus medicare is that some private plans require the
beneficiary to pay for the care in advance, and then seek reimbursement. This directly impedes
access.69
Not only is the process of receiving care under private plans different, but private plans
are also treated differently by health facilities. Not surprisingly, given their temporary status, the
most common point of access to health care services for SAWP workers is through walk-in
clinics. However, some walk-in clinics do not accept private health care plans—once again
requiring the insured worker to pay for the service in advance and then seek repayment.70 As a
result, otherwise accessible health care facilities are rendered inaccessible. The cost of a
consultation coupled with the need to have cash on hand thereby becomes an immediate barrier
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to realizing the promised rights for workers. This situation clearly demonstrates how a right on
paper to private health care that is equivalent to medicare remains out of reach in practice. Where
provinces have regulated that SAWP workers will automatically be enrolled in medicare, these
barriers, at least, fall away; however, they remain for all Agricultural Stream workers.
This differential treatment between private health care and medicare, with its identified
adverse impacts on access, exists because of provincial decisions to shift the cost of health care
insurance to employers, or, in the case of some provinces, to the SAWP workers themselves, and
then to have those payments go to private companies. Clearly if Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba
have found that it is in their interest to extend medicare immediately to SAWP workers, such an
arrangement could be reached in other provinces. It is not economical, and it makes no common
sense, for provincial regimes to force employers or workers to pay for insurance for health care
services that those workers may then be unable to access. The health insecurity that agricultural
workers experience, due to access barriers associated with private health care plans, are entirely
foreseeable and a product of the regulatory regime.
B. Workers’ compensation regimes are designed to serve nationals
Workers’ compensation regimes are, in general, supported by employers and employees
alike,71 although they do have shortcomings.72 In their review and assessment of these regimes in
Canada, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal identified a myriad of benefits associated with them,
such as: the employer’s solvency is irrelevant to employee recovery, benefits are immediately
payable, and the program “responds positively to the needs of an injured worker.”73
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One would expect these advantages to translate into workers’ compensation regimes
serving all covered workers well, regardless of migration status. But they do not. As noted
above, surveys of temporary agricultural workers indicate that they continue to work when
injured, and often fail to seek compensation. The data on compensation claims in British
Columbia is consistent with such practices. The average number of workers’ compensation
claims for SAWP workers is 40 percent lower than the provincial industry average. 74 Either
nationals are extremely unlucky on the job, or else there is considerable underreporting of workrelated illness or injury by SAWP workers, perhaps coupled with the inability to effectively
pursue claims.75 The regulatory regime fosters these twinned outcomes because it was not
designed to recognize how SAWP workers are differently situated than nationals.
Ethnographic researchers have documented how these circumstances play out in the lives
of some temporary migrant workers. McLaughlin and Hennebry, for example, describe how one
worker, “Steve,” suffered a workplace injury due to being asked to ride on the back of a farm
vehicle. Steve’s physician ordered physiotherapy and an MRI. While he received workers’
compensation for several days of missed work, when Steve returned to work he found himself
unable to perform modified work duties. His employer informed Steve that he would be returned
to his home country because he was not performing his contracted-for duties. The MRI and
physiotherapy were still pending, and scheduled for shortly after Steve’s flight was to depart.
Steve did not board his flight, knowing that he would not be able to access an MRI or treatment
in Jamaica. Not surprisingly, upon evading his planned departure, Steve’s work permit, and thus
health care coverage, came to an end. The MRI became financially inaccessible and was never
performed. When Steve returned to Jamaica and brought a workers compensation claim, it was
rejected, in part because Steve did not have an MRI to substantiate his claimed injuries.76
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In their survey of reported decisions concerning temporary workers (including
agricultural workers) who sought workers’ compensation in Quebec, Sikka, Leppel, and Hanley
described how the regime’s requirements created unique difficulties for foreign workers due to
how their migration status intersects with their employment status. These difficulties included
having claims denied due to not accessing physicians in a timely manner (an expectation that for
reasons discussed above may be quite onerous for agricultural migrant workers to meet), having
returned to their countries of origin and thus being unavailable for medical evaluation by a
Quebec physician, being unable to participate in rehabilitation programs (due to not being in
Canada), or being unable to attend and testify at appeals of their claims (due to not being in
Canada).77 Reported decisions from Ontario concerning SAWP workers show similar patterns.
For example, one injured worker did not apply to renew his work permit, knowing he would not
be referred to the program, and so his claim was undermined by the determination that he was
not sufficiently pursuing work.78 In a case involving a Jamaican worker, there was no award for
lost future earnings because, had the worker remained in Canada, the Ontario labour market was
such that despite having amputated fingers, the worker would have been able to find other
minimum wage jobs. The worker appealed on the ground that he would not be able to obtain
employment at that wage level in Jamaica. The board denied the appeal, concluding it could not
assess economic loss in the context of the Jamaican labour market, only the Ontario market. The
Board wrote:
[T]he Act was intended to provide compensation to workers injured in Ontario with compensation
determined according to employment standards and conditions that exist in Ontario. The fact that a
worker must leave Ontario soon after an accident, regardless of the reason for leaving, may have the
incidental effect of increasing the magnitude of the economic loss experienced by the worker. In my
view, such increased loss was not intended to be compensated by the Act. 79

Assuming the above decisions are reasonable interpretations of the statutes in question, it
is clear that the workers’ compensation adjudicative system is often incompatible with the reality
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and legal regime that governs migrant agricultural workers. Its mere importation does not result
in its benefits being transferred to said workers.
Marsden relates stories of SAWP workers who were pressured not to pursue workers’
compensation claims. One worker alleged that his attempt to seek guidance from the workers’
compensation board resulted in punitive actions being taken against him: “I talked to WCB and
that bothered my boss. He wanted to fire me…then I was reported to abandon my job and that
was sent…to the Consulate of Mexico…My boss gave his version and it’s his word versus my
word.”80 Being identified as having abandoned one’s job would result in the work permit being
repealed, and the worker being required to leave Canada. Similarly situated national workers
certainly experience vulnerability, and may end up in a “their word versus my word” situation,
but they will not face analogous consequences and indeed can remain in Canada and claim
wrongful dismissal. This dynamic fosters a troubling power dynamic “that favours employers
and makes workers less willing to seek redress for violations of their statutory rights under
provincial law.”81 The SAWP program offers the employee no formal mechanism to challenge
an employer’s claim about them. Even if it did, the reliance upon being nominated for return
work means that an employee who brings a claim is likely also bringing the possibility of future
employment in Canada to an end.82
The needs of nationals can, in principle, be supported by a workers’ compensation regime
that may take several years to reach final decisions, include programs of rehabilitation that
contemplate a potentially long-term scale for recovery, assume full access to the labour market,
and expect mitigation of losses. Migrant workers, on the other hand, lose the right to remain in
Canada once the employment contract ends. As migrant workers must leave Canada, they are
obviously excluded from key aspects of compensation such as rehabilitation83 and re-training,84
which are a vital part of the workers’ compensation regime. These regime-generated factors,
along with more mundane practical issues such as being unable to navigate forms or effectively
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communicate with physicians about the cause of the incident,85 results in workers’ compensation
regimes not serving them as they do nationals, despite having, in principle, equal access to them.
This lack of access has consequences that directly affects their ability to remain in Canada: upon
becoming ill or injured, and thus potentially in need of workplace compensation, they also
become eligible for medical repatriation.
C. The fear of medical repatriation is reasonable
The most commonly cited reason offered by SAWP agricultural migrant workers for not
seeking medical care was the fear of being repatriated and thus losing employment. Pursuant to
the employment agreement, after consulting with the home country’s government’s agent,
employers “shall be entitled for non-compliance, refusal to work, or any other sufficient reason
stated in this agreement, to prematurely cease the worker’s employment.”86 The agreement
further expressly contemplates workers needing to return to their home country for medical
reasons that are not related to pre-existing physical or medical conditions.87 The requirement to
involve the consular office does not mitigate worker vulnerability. The local consular officials
can be expected to have conflicting interests. The SWAP work results in considerable remissions
to home states. Consular officers are motivated to ensure employers feel well-served by their
citizens, to try to maximize the number of workers from their home country working in Canada,
and to avoid employers switching source countries.88 As such, they may be inclined to use their
discretion to keep employers happy.
Canada does not collect information on medical repatriations.89 However, it was recorded
that between 2001 and 2011, at least 787 migrant agricultural workers were explicitly repatriated
for medical reasons.90 This data was collected by a private sector organization that “facilitate[s]
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and coordinate[s] the processing of requests for foreign seasonal agricultural workers.”91 It was
entered into evidence as part of a human rights tribunal hearing regarding the death of a SAWP
worker, Ned Peart. A group of researchers obtained a redacted version of the dataset through an
access to information request, analyzed it, and published their findings.92 Less than 2 percent of
these repatriations were recorded as having been at the request of the worker. In almost all cases,
the employer exercised their right to report that the worker could no longer do the job they were
hired for, and must have asserted that no accommodations were possible. This brought the work
permit to an end and the worker was required to leave Canada.
Of those who were repatriated, 41.3 percent were for medical or surgical reasons,
including back and limb problems,93 and 25.5 percent were for external injuries: the most
common injuries were upper body related and including muscle strain, and broken or severed
fingers, hands, wrists, and shoulders, although poisoning was also cited.94 As the authors of the
study concluded, while the dataset does not state whether the injuries or illnesses were directly
related to work, “most reported injuries are likely directly related to agricultural work.”95
The overall rates of known medical repatriation are relatively low figures. They range
from 2.22 workers per 1,000 in 2011 to 7.81 workers per 1,000 in 2003. However, the
knowledge that one could be repatriated for allegedly health-based reasons serves to discipline
and render workers vulnerable.96 In her Ontario survey, Hennebry found that 45 percent of
SAWP workers reported their co-workers continued working while sick due to fear of what their
employers would do.97 This self-reported situation was more broadly confirmed in the Peart
decision, where a human rights tribunal found:
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While actual rates of repatriation may be relatively low, it is the broad discretion afforded to
employers to repatriate SAWP workers and the fear of triggering such action which serves as a
powerful barrier to SAWP workers in making complaints about their employers.98

Studies bear out this conclusion: workers consistently cite the fear of being sent home as being
why they fail to report or act to have their illness or injury treated.99 Migrant workers are, for the
same reason, less likely to request safety equipment, report potential hazards and accidents, and
are more likely to accept unsafe work or work when ill or injured “because of a fear of loss of
employment.”100
D. The nomination process is also at the heart of the problem
Most of the workers coming to Canada through SAWP are returning workers. Although
entry into the program from the home country is mediated by the home government, employers
can nominate—or name—workers who they would like to return in subsequent seasons. Workers
are highly motivated to be so nominated: the average amount of money that is remitted by
Mexican workers for a five-month period of work is $5,000 to $6,000, a sum that is 2.2 times
higher than what a person would receive working minimum wage in Mexico for a year. While
the figure appears modest, it can be expected to make “the difference between a decent life and
one of desperation.”101
In 2010, 78 percent of Mexican SAWP workers were nominated return workers.102 The
nomination process results in the majority of workers returning to participate in the program for
four to six years, with a fifth of workers continuing to participate for more than ten years.103 As
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such, the SAWP program operates as a “circular” migratory worker program.104 As noted in
copious reports, including a significant study by the North-South Institute, this creates a clear
incentive for workers to set themselves up to be nominated for future years, and so they may not
report workplace related safety issues.105 Once again, the threat of not being nominated for return
does not need to be uttered to have coercive effect. The mere fact that this discretion rests in the
hands of the employer—to choose not to nominate a worker the following year—is selfdisciplining. Hence Preibish and Otero’s findings where 69 percent of the 100 surveyed Mexican
SAWP workers in British Columbia said they worked when ill or injured due to concerns about
jeopardizing future employment.106
The threat that hangs over the head of the Agricultural Stream workers is that their work
permits, like those of SAWP workers, can be unilaterally brought to an end by the employer if
the employee is claimed to be no longer able to work.
In her in-depth study of migrant workers, Sarah Marsden interviewed employees working
in agencies that served migrant workers. They reported that SAWP workers who had medical
conditions were reported to the program, and were unlikely to be offered permits in subsequent
years.107 Other studies have found that those workers who were not nominated by specific
employers for return were unlikely to be selected by their home governments, unless the
employer evaluation, which the employee does not see, is very positive.108 While this
information is anecdotal, it points to the highly discretionary nature of the work permit process,
where the worker must either be selected by the home government or else nominated by the
employer. SAWP workers thus live with the overarching threat of being replaced arbitrarily, and
without recourse.109

104

Ibid at 13. Workers coming in under the Agricultural Stream, on the other hand, can work in Canada for no more
than four years before being precluded from obtaining a temporary work permit for another four years.
105
Brem, supra note 48 at 4; Hennebry, “Permanently Temporary?”, supra note 11 at 14.
106
Preibisch & Otero, “Does Citizenship Status Matter”, supra note 21 at 185.
107
Marsden, supra note 28 at para 27.
108
Fudge, supra note 12 at 113; Preibisch & Otero, “Does Citizenship Status Matter”, supra note 21 at 183.
109
McLaughlin & Hennebry, supra note 76 at 183.

23

The Canadian government is well aware of these problems in accessing promised rights.
During hearings before a House of Commons Standing Committee on temporary foreign workers
in 2016, briefs were submitted to support claims regarding the experiences of SAWP workers
who become ill or experience a workplace injury. In particular, that workers are denied medical
care. This is because their eligibility to access health insurance turns on their continuing to have
a valid work permit, but upon becoming ill or injured their work permit is cancelled and they are
deported.110 Despite concluding that practices such as the power of SAWP employers to return
injured workers to their country of origin “are having a negative impact on temporary foreign
workers,” the committee did not make any recommendations to address such impacts.111 Their
silence on this point is troubling. The committee did, however, respond to concerns about labour
standards violations and safety enforcement gaps where migrant workers are too fearful of losing
their jobs to report the issue. They recommended increasing the frequency of site visits to ensure
that labour laws are being enforced, and to guarantee “that any workplace injuries that require
immediate attention be granted emergency care where deemed necessary in Canada.”112 This
recommendation is sound, but very limited in its scope.
V.

Conclusion

In her assessment of agricultural workers, Fudge concluded that with SAWP employment
agreements “the basic legal premise is that permanent resident and migrant workers should be
treated equally under the law.”113 This approach explains why the International Labour
Organization (ILO) identifies Canada “as exemplifying best practices under a rights-based
approach for implementing the international standards pertaining to the protection of migrant
workers at the national level.”114 However, these best practices, as identified through protocols
and on paper, are inconsistently operationalized at a lived level. This is because when labour
laws intersect with migration law, there is “a differentiated supply of labour that produces
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precarious workers and precarious employment norms.”115 Workers’ vulnerability is
institutionalized through the very structure of the legal regime.116
Commenting on this structure, some scholars identify Canada as having built a regime “to
provide the ideal workforce in the form of a limitless and constant source of fit, healthy migrant
labour, which can be easily removed, returned and replaced the moment any problem or concern
arises.”117 Employers are certainly very supportive of the SAWP program. They describe SAWP
workers as essential for the success of their businesses; they are hard working, cost effective, and
willing to do work that Canadians do not want to do. Employers also see the program as being
incredibly beneficial to SAWP workers because of the relative earning potential that the workers
experience.118 However, the economic precarity that drives workers to see the program as a
“win” has deeply troubling operational consequences.
A 2014 human rights tribunal summarized the extensive evidence it received on the SAWP
program as follows:
The structure of the SAWP is such as to create one of the primary conditions of vulnerability for this
group. I accept the evidence before me that, because of the “closed” employment relationship and risk
and fear of repatriation, SAWP workers are reluctant to make complaints about their employers,
including health and safety complaints, are more willing to continue working while sick or injured,
and are less able to resist work demands placed upon them, including both the nature of the work
being performed and the incredibly long hours of work required.119

115

Ibid at 96.
See e.g. Audrey Macklin, “Freeing Migration From the State: Michael Trebilcock on Migration Policy” (2010)
60:2 UTLJ 315 at 332.
117
McLaughlin & Hennebry, supra note 76 at 175.
118
Miya Narushima & Ana Lourdes Sanchez, “Employers’ Paradoxical Views About Temporary Foreign Migrant
Workers’ Health: A Qualitative Study in Rural Farms in Southern Ontario” (2014) 13:65 Intl J Equity in Health 1 at
5–6.
119
Peart v Ontario, supra note 96 at para 273 (the case concerned whether inquiries should be mandatory when
SAWP workers die on the job, as it is in several other areas of industry).
116

25

On the surface, the Canadian practice would seem to align with a post-national citizenship
model, where residency, not citizenship, is central to whether an individual bears rights.120 At the
same time, it is clear that while the migrant agricultural worker programs are understood and
valued, changes to the programs are driven by the employers. Deckard and Heslin summarize the
situation as follows:
Whereas postnational citizenship would expect the basis of rights and acceptance to lie in the migrant
labourer as a human being, endowed with certain unalienable rights, conversations regarding
immigrant laborers revolve primarily around their capacity to contribute to the health and success of
the local economy without detracting from local employment. 121

There are many aspects of the provincial and federal regime that could be scrutinized and
modified to enable to the system to achieve what I believe is its goal: to provide temporary
agricultural workers with equivalent health protections. Such aspects include:
 Consider how the principles of workers’ compensation can be made relevant to seasonal
foreign workers and if provinces should be urged to modify their approaches in light of
such workers’ unique situation.
 Consider the viability and value of mandatory health exams when workers leave Canada,
and follow-up care based on those exams.
 Consider the viability of on-site health exams.
 Reconsider the role of nominations within the regulatory regime.
 Identify whether there are any barriers to all provinces following the lead of Quebec,
Manitoba, and Ontario regarding extending medicare to all SAWP workers. If there are,
identify how to address these barriers.
 Determine the viability of all provinces extending medicare to Agricultural Stream
workers.
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 Revisit the terms for medical deportation. In particular, do not allow medical deportation
without an assessment of whether the medical condition is work-related (and then, only
allow if appropriate care is meaningfully available in the source country).
 Begin the systematic collection of health care utilization data and medical deportation
data, so that we better understand whether and how the regime is actually working.
In sum, Canada’s efforts to protect temporary migrant workers are commendable and
obviously work in some instances. The federal government has built programs that are premised
on care and compensation. That protection, however, is precarious in that health needs or injuries
can become either direct or indirect grounds for medical deportation, even if the illness or injury
is work-related. The health and safety regulatory regimes are, in many instances, of limited value
for actually protecting the health and well-being of migrant workers. While these regimes create
expectations of care and protection, the entwinement between systemic structural legal factors,
such as employer discretion, and non-legal factors, such as economic desperation, mean these
expectations may never be realized.
Provincial laws and policies are constructed around a labour force that is presumed to be
mobile.122 Where this premise is flawed and provincial legislation fails to account for the lack of
labour mobility and the absence of a continuing right to remain and seek work in Canada, it
cannot provide equivalent protections to migrant workers. When the lack of provincial
protections is combined with a federal regime that imbues the employer with the power to
determine if a worker is likely to be able to return to Canada to work in future seasons, the
regulatory regime fosters an employment relationship of gross vulnerability.123 The potential for
both intentional and unintentional exploitation is built into the system.
Further, there is no designated oversight from any one level of government; divided
jurisdiction between the federal and provincial governments can make it very easy for each level
of government to take a back seat.124 It is notable that many provincial governments have acted
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to provide extra protections, such as making medicare immediately available. However, the
provincial variations in their experiences, despite coming under the same overarching MOU, is
troubling. If Canada’s commitments are to be substantively fulfilled, we must identify strategies
that consider the situation and unique protection needs of migrant farm workers.125
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